|
SOMEBODY IN
WASHINGTON
LOVES
KANSAS
WHEAT GROWERS
Introduction. The prices used to
calculate the disaster program have been announced but the use of the
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) marketing year average
2002 price will not be complete for spring crops until September 1.
Therefore it is expected the 2002 NASS Summary Report will be used
to set NASS prices. USDA also
announced the disaster aid signup date starting June 6. The USDA press
release is located at:
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2003/03/0102.htm
Most insured growers
will find the final USDA policy decision that sets the payment cap is an
improvement over some of the proposed alternatives.
Because USDA will use the higher of the crop insurance price
election or the NASS average price, the result is a higher limit on per
acre benefits. This will
result in fewer farmers suffering a reduction in disaster aid payments.
Someone in
Washington
must love Kansas Wheat growers because the
NASS price used to set the cap is $3.60
and few if any
Kansas
wheat growers will suffer a reduction in
disaster aid.
Kansas
wheat Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) payment
price was $3.34 and Revenue Assurance with Harvest Price Option (RA-HPO
paid $3.40) and that is much lower than the NASS price used to set the
cap. This in not true for
Nebraska
wheat growers where the CRC wheat payment
price was $3.72. In states
where the wheat revenue insurance payment price was higher than the wheat
NASS price some wheat growers may (will) hit the payment cap.
In Kansas on 2002 wheat there were no RA offers at 80% and 85%
coverage in 2002 (higher RA coverages were available on Kansas wheat in
2003). Therefore it will not
be possible for RA insured
Kansas
wheat growers to exceed the cap.
It appears only 85% CRC or MPCI-APH insured
Kansas
wheat growers have any chance of exceeding
the per acre cap but very few
Kansas
farmers bought 85% coverage.
Because of the higher CRC payment price one would expect more
Nebraska
wheat farmers will hit the cap.
The result is that highly insured
Kansas
wheat farmers with the added disaster aid
will end up with the about the same number of dollars as
Nebraska
wheat growers.
Corn,
Milo
,
and Soybeans Disaster.
For corn farmers only the revenue insured growers are likely to
exceed the cap and then it will likely require a yield loss that is
greater than 90%. The reason
corn farmers are hitting the limit is because the CRC payment price was
$2.52 (RA-HPO paid $2.43) and that is higher that the NASS $2.35 price
used to set the cap.
Milo
growers are less likely to hit the cap
because the cap price is $2.41 and CRC paid $2.39.
Because the CRC payment price is lower than the cap price it is
unlikely milo growers will exceed the cap.
There is no RA offer on milo.
The CRC and RA-HPO
soybean payment price was $5.45 and that is slightly higher than the NASS
$5.40 price used to set the cap. The
MPCI-APH paid $4.92 and RA without the harvest price option paid $4.50.
It is unlikely that MPCI-APH insured soybeans growers will exceed
the cap and no chance for the “basic” RA insured grower to exceed the
soybean cap.
Price
Defined. The major disaster aid
issue left was the prices in the disaster formula.
USDA has defined (1) the price used to pay disaster payments, (2)
price used to value any production, and (3) the price used to calculate
the per acre cap on payments. The
price that will be used to pay most
Kansas
disaster claims will be the MPCI price
elections. Only if there is no
MPCI price election available will USDA use a 5 year average price.
The per acre payment
cap and value of any production price will equal the higher of the
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) seasonal average price or
the MPCI price election. For
2002 most
Kansas
crops will use the NASS price with the
exception of upland cotton.
For disaster aid
claims on 2001 crops, the 2001/2002 marketing year NASS average price for
corn was $1.97, wheat $2.78,
milo $1.94, soybeans $4.38 and 29.8 cents for upland cotton.
The 2001 MPCI-APH price elections for corn was $2.05, wheat $2.80,
milo $1.95, soybeans $5.26 and 60 cents for upland cotton.
Therefore, the MPCI-APH price elections will be used rather than
NASS prices for 2001 payment caps and calculating value of any production.
The 2002 MPCI-APH
price elections for corn was $2.00, wheat $3.15, milo $1.85, soybeans
$4.92 and 52 cents for upland cotton.
The seasonal average NASS prices are not reported until after the
marketing year, that ends on May 31 for wheat and August 31 for the other
crops. Therefore, it is
expected that USDA will use the prices reported by NASS in Crop Values
2002 Summary, released in February 2003.
This report generates a national average NASS price.
Based on the NASS
February report the seasonal average corn price is $2.35, $3.60 for wheat,
$2.41 for milo, and $5.40 for soybeans.
NASS prices are higher than the MPCI price election and the NASS
price will be used in the disaster formula.
Because the NASS prices for upland cotton is 40.5 cents, the MPCI
price election of 52 cents will be used in the formula for cotton disaster
aid.
Yield
Defined. The historical yield will
be the higher of the 5 year average county yield or crop insurance’s
Actual Production History (APH). The
exact crop years used to calculate the county average yield have not been
identified.
Crop disaster payments
are subject to a per acre cap on payments that will effect all farm sizes.
For most 2002 Kansas crops the sum of (1) any crop production times
the seasonal average NASS price, (2) the disaster payment, and (3) the
crop-insurance indemnity less the farmer paid premium cannot exceed 95
percent times the historical yield times average NASS price.
Crops that have a higher MPCI-APH price than NASS will substitute
the MPCI-APH price for the NASS price in the previous formula.
The crop disaster payments will be reduced if the per acre cap on
benefits is exceeded.
Example
Kansas
Dryland Corn Case Farm.
An example
Western Kansas
corn farm with 100 bushel average yield
was developed in table 1 to examine the disaster program.
In this particular example, the farm was compared with no insurance
purchased, 50% CAT insurance, 75% MPCI-APH, and 75% revenue insurance.
A grower with nearly a total crop loss of a 99% yield loss was
assumed. A total yield loss on
dryland corn in the western 2/3 of
Kansas
is not unusual.
Disaster
Aid Defined with a 99% Yield Loss.
The disaster aid provided by
the 65/50 program passed by Congress would pay this example grower a
maximum of $65 if insured and $58.50 if uninsured.
This is calculated based on 100 bushels times 65% times the
MPCI-APH price election of $2.00 times 50%.
In the example in
table 1 it is assumed the corn grower suffered a 99% yield loss and the
cap is based on the NASS price of $2.35.
The disaster aid payment based on yield loss below the trigger
point times the 50% of MPCI-APH market price would generate a disaster
payment of $64 versus $57.60 for the insured grower.
The insured grower at 75% coverage would generate an indemnity
payment on line 18 of $148 for MPCI-APH, $186.48 for CRC, $179.82 for RA-HPO,
and $171.57 for “basic” RA.
The net insurance
payments (less premium) plus the disaster payment plus value of the
salvaged crop would generate a total value of $238.28 for CRC, $234.83 for
RA-HPO, and $227.97 for RA on line 21.
The maximum benefit cap is $223.25 for this grower based on 100
bushels times $2.35 times 95 percent.
All of the revenue insurance products exceeded the cap and that
means this grower will have her disaster aid payment reduced on line 23.
There was no payment reduction for uninsured, CAT or the MPCI-APH
alternatives. The disaster
payments were reduced by $15.03 for CRC, $11.58 for RA-HPO and $4.72 for
basic RA.
Higher
Crop Insurance Coverages Reduce Disaster Aid.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 shows how different coverage levels will impact
the amount of dollars revenue insured growers will be able to collect on
their disaster aid. For
example, at an 85% RA-HPO insurance guarantee and a 99% yield loss this
grower will lose 41% of the disaster payment.
If this same grower had purchased a 70% RA-HPO insurance contract
he\she would have lost less than 3% of the disaster aid payment.
One would have
expected the reduction in disaster aid would have been greatest under CRC
because CRC paid larger indemnity payments than RA-HPO.
CRC paid $2.52 for lost corn production while RA-HPO paid $2.43 for
lost production. The 70% and
75% CRC coverage did show a larger reduction in disaster aid than RA-HPO
but not at the 80% and 85% coverage levels (figures 1 and 2).
The reason is that RA-HPO premiums are lower than CRC premiums at
all coverage levels for this location.
Therefore, the net RA-HPO indemnity payment is higher than the net
CRC indemnity payment at the 80% and 85% coverage levels even though the
gross CRC indemnity payments are larger.
RA with out the harvest price option insured growers with a total
crop loss also suffered a reduction in disaster aid if he/she purchased
coverage at 75% and greater (figure 3).
The MPCI-APH insured
grower suffered no disaster aid loss at this location.
This is a high risk dryland growing area.
If the MPCI-APH premiums were lower as would be the case in a lower
risk growing area, then some MPCI-APH insured growers may also suffer a
reduction in disaster payments if the yield loss is large.
Lower
Yields Reduce Disaster Aid.
Growers with a total yield loss obviously have the greatest
reduction in their disaster payments with higher insurance coverage
purchased. Therefore, most
growers will need to suffer a yield loss over 90% before they would suffer
any reduction in disaster aid, then only if they purchased high levels of
crop insurance coverage. Figure
4 shows how different yield levels will impact the amount of dollars RA-HPO
insured growers will be able to collect on their disaster aid.
For example, an 85% RA-HPO insured grower will lose 42% of their
disaster aid payments with a zero yield.
If this same grower had produced 25% of a normal yield or 75% yield
loss his/her disaster aid would only have been reduced by less than 1%.
Revenue insured corn growers with larger yield losses obviously
have the greatest chance for reduction in their disaster payments.
Because the formula uses net indemnity payments the high risk
growing areas will require a larger yield loss to suffer a loss in
disaster payments because the larger premium is deducted first.
Disaster
Aid Does Help.
These “highly” insured growers are clearly better off because
of the disaster aid payment being provided to them.
The use of the NASS price is higher than the MPCI-APH corn price
election, therefore using the NASS price increased the cap and reduced the
number of corn growers that will suffer a reduction in disaster aid.
However, many growers may look at their current insurance position
and discover they would have been better off if they had bought the lower
coverage levels. With a total
yield loss clearly growers would have ended up with the same total number
of dollars because they would have collected more in disaster aid
payments.
So the real question
is will growers view this as a windfall payment or as a message to reduce
their insurance coverage levels from 75 and 80 percent coverage to perhaps
70% or changing from revenue insurance to MPCI-APH in the future.
Because one can never be certain how any future disaster aid may be
provided this becomes a fairly tricky question.
The definition of prices used to calculate disaster aid payments
under went many changes by public policy makers after Congress passed the
Law. If growers could make a
new 2002 crop insurance purchase decision after the disaster aid was
approved they would have purchased lower coverage because the difference
is made up in the form of disaster aid payments.
Lower insured growers
probably should thank the growers that purchased higher levels of revenue
insurance coverage. It is
unlikely that policy makers would have used the higher NASS prices to set
the per acre payment limit if there had not been so many corn growers who
had purchased the higher revenue insurance coverages.
$80,000
Limit. There is an $80,000 payment
limit on disaster aid. There
will be some farmers with disaster payments below the cap but will have
their disaster aid cut because of the $80,000 payment limit.
Not
Defined. This analysis assumes the
“all wheat” NASS price. The
definition of which wheat price to use has not been settled.
It is my understanding that some wheat state Senators have
suggested to USDA the appropriate wheat price is the “all wheat” price
as reported by NASS.
Because the MPCI-APH
price election is not separated between spring wheat and winter wheat, it
makes sense to use the “all wheat” NASS price to set the cap and to
calculate the value of any wheat production.
Also in 2001 the MPCI-APH wheat price election is higher than the
NASS price. Therefore, in 2001
there would be one cap price for spring and winter wheat because there is
only one MPCI-APH wheat price election.
It is reasonable to assume if USDA uses a single wheat cap price in
2001, then one would also use a single wheat price cap in 2002.
It has not been
reported publicly the 5 crop years that will be used to calculate the
county average yield. For example, will USDA use crop years 1996-2000?
One would assume 2001 yields would not be used in the county
average yield because that was one of the disaster years.
Summary.
Assuming the “all wheat” NASS price is used, few if any
Kansas
wheat growers will hit the cap on
payments. The CRC payment
price for a total wheat loss is $3.34 and a higher $3.60 cap means there
will be few
Kansas
wheat growers that will hit the cap.
However, this is not true in
Nebraska
and other wheat states.
The CRC payment rate in
Nebraska
is $3.72 and because it is higher then the
$3.60 cap price some
Nebraska
wheat growers will hit the cap.
On corn, the CRC
payment price was $2.52 and the NASS cap price is $2.35.
Because the CRC insurance payment price is higher then the cap
price there will be some corn growers that will hit the cap.
Glass
Half Full. Using the higher of the
NASS price or the MPCI price election is clearly “farmer friendly”!
Without this change the cap would have been lower.
Even with a cap farmers will receive some (in most cases all) of
the disaster payment. So
farmers are clearly better off to have disaster program.
Even in the worst case scenario where corn farmers lose 40% of the
disaster payment, would growers prefer 60% of something or 100% of
nothing?
|