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Further more; “The
producer must include all insured crops for which revenue protection(s)
available and in which the producer has a share, except winter barley and
winter wheat, which may not be included in the whole-farm unit. Fall planted
crops are excluded from the whole-farm unit because the different growing
seasons make it impossible to establish the guarantee or premium that may be
owed at the time of application because the information regarding the spring
planted crops is not yet available. Further, producers with fall planted
crops would have to wait until after harvest of all their spring planted
crops before an indemnity could be paid. An additional premium discount is
available when the producer elects the whole-farm unit” (Federal Register /
Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14, 2006 / Proposed Rules, p. 40199)
Whole Farm Unit.
While there does not seem to be great interest in a whole farm unit,
eliminating winter wheat from the whole farm unit does not seem justified.
Growers do not know the exact premium at signup time when they have only
spring crops. If corn-soybean growers decide to plant more acres of
soybeans than corn than they intended to plant at sign up, their total
premium will change. Also growers sign up a crop but plant no acres and
turn in a zero acreage report will owe no premium. As for the need to wait
until fall for indemnity payments that is still a shorter wait on payments
that is currently in place for GRIP/GRP when winter wheat growers must wait
for county yields to be published, normally about 10 months after harvest.
While none of these are
good arguments for eliminating winter wheat from the whole farm guarantee,
there are a lot of good reasons to include winter wheat. The major reason
is that winter wheat and spring crops are growing at different times of the
year causing less correlation between crop yields. If crops are perfectly
correlated then there is no reason for creating a whole farm unit.
Enterprise Unit.
There is interest in the enterprise unit. Currently CRC and RA have
different definitions for an enterprise unit and under some conditions one
definition is preferred to other definitions. The propose rules state only
the following on enterprise units: FCIC is also proposing that an
enterprise unit may be available for certain crops, as designated in the
actuarial documents (Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday,
July 14, 2006 / Proposed Rules, p. 40199).
Currently farmers can
select the enterprise unit definition that best fits their farm by selecting
IP, RA, or CRC. RMA is proposing to use the RA definition for an enterprise
unit. It will depend on the location and size of farm to determine the
preferred enterprise definition by individual farmers.
No Harvest Price
Option Endorsement Only. “FCIC proposes to use the commodity
exchanges to establish a projected price and a harvest price (the harvest
price will only be used for crops with revenue protection). FCIC also
proposes that the revised policy provide coverage for both an increase and
decrease in price, unless the producer selects the harvest price exclusion
option” (Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14, 2006
/ Proposed Rules, p. 40199).
Growers are not allowed to
select the Harvest Price Option (HPO) without first selecting the revenue
insurance endorsement. Why only allow growers to exclude the harvest price
option endorsement? Why not let the insured retain the HPO endorsement but
exclude the downside revenue endorsement. This would provide growers with
replace coverage that would replace lost bushels at their current market
value and growers could then cover lower prices with forward contracts,
futures, options and FSA commodity programs. If RMA is willing to allow the
purchase of downside price revenue coverage only then they should also be
willing to allow growers to purchase only the upside price replacement
coverage endorsement on the basic Combo coverage.
RMA Estimated Base
Price and Volatility. “RMA proposes to add an informational tool
to RMA’s Web site that will accumulate revenue protection volatility factors
and projected prices and harvest prices, as defined in the Commodity
Exchange Price Provisions, during the price discovery period. While the
values in the accumulator will only be estimates until the price discovery
period expires, this informational tool will be useful for producers and
agents to begin making informed decisions about the risk management
alternatives as far in advance of sales closing dates as possible” (Federal
Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14, 2006 / Proposed Rules, p.
40200).
Several private crop
insurance companies and KSU have been providing this information on
AgManager.Info for years! What possible rule could prevent RMA from
publishing their estimate stating today? Why is it necessary to have a
Federal rule? Growers would love to have the RMA forecasted CRC High/Low
factors starting with the 2007 winter wheat crop.
If this is a valuable
forecast then perhaps users would be willing to pay a fee. I doubt it
because many insurance companies tract this information on their WEB site.
If RMA is “protecting the tax payer” then this does not seem to be a good
use of resources, especially since many insurance companies already provide
it.
Eliminate Revenue
Insurance in Some Years? FCIC is also proposing that “if
there is insufficient price information to set the projected price for a
crop, the projected price will be determined by FCIC and no revenue
protection will be available” (Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday,
July 14, 2006 / Proposed Rules, p. 40200).
This rule would eliminate
revenue insurance for some crops in years when the appropriate futures do
not trade. Because RMA is making greater use of the September winter wheat
futures contract for price discovery the elimination of revenue insurance in
selected years is more likely than one might think. There have been years
when the September wheat contract has been lightly or not traded during the
fall measurement period and would not met the definition in some of the new
proposed futures price measurements. It would seem that RMA would at least
want to refer the question to the Board rather than cancel the affected
revenue insurance contract.
Crops to be
Eliminated from Revenue Insurance. RMA proposes to eliminate
revenue coverage on corn silage, rapeseed, sunflowers, and Canola. The
bottom line is RMA will not forecast any basis in a revenue insurance
contract. They will only consider crops that are traded on a futures
market. This same principle also eliminates the settlement of wheat
contracts based on the Portland cash wheat price in the Pacific Northwest.
One would assume growers could purchase GRIP on their corn silage, but the
document is silent on this issue.
Rating Method.
“For the revised Basic Provisions and Crop Provisions, for revenue
protection, premium rates are calculated by a rating model incorporating the
variability and correlation of yield and price. For yield protection,
premium rates are calculated the same as the APH policy” (Federal
Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14, 2006 / Proposed Rules, p.
40201).
This provision simply says
RMA will use the RA rating method rather than the CRC rating method. RMA
will assume any historical price yield correlation will apply at the field
or optional unit level (sub-farm level) and the correlation will remain
unchanged in a world market versus a historical domestic dominated market.
RMA will also continue to use options that are often thinly traded to set
the volility measurement. Apparently there was no consideration in
measuring the volility directly from the futures contract.
Does The Basic Combo
Policy Provide Yield Protection? If market prices increase during
the life of an APH contract, then in a loss situation APH will NOT
provide enough indemnity dollars to replace lost bushes at current market
value. However, growers that are feeding their production or have forward
contracted their grain must purchase those bushels at the current higher
market price, not at the forecasted price set by RMA at signup. Under the
Combo policy with no endorsements, lost yield measurement triggers the
payments based on the forecasted price set by RMA at signup, but if market
prices increase then indemnity payment will not replace lost production at
current market value.
The APH policy (and the
prior name MPCI) do not guarantee yield. These products guarantee “yield”
if and on if the RMA price forecast is correct. However all marketing plans
including buying put options assume growers will have production to offset
the forward pricing of the crop. If production is not assumed then one does
not need to be a farmer, because anyone can sell futures or buy put
options. Uninsured farmers with failed crops who have sold futures are in
exactly the same financial position as Chicago speculative traders. Under
the Combo policy growers will need to purchase the harvest price option
endorsement (HPO) to guarantee production at replacement value not at a
forecasted price set at harvest.
Limit on RA-HPO
Coverage. “For the revised Basic Provisions and Crop Provisions,
FCIC proposes that the harvest price will not exceed 160 percent of the
projected price” (Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14,
2006 / Proposed Rules, p. 40201).
The current RA-HPO policy
has no liability limit while CRC has a limit on the change in price (Limit
for corn is $1.50 and similar limits on other crops). The new policy would
set the limit on price increases at 160% of the base price and these limits
would be similar to the CRC limits. Those CRC limits were set when the
private Market Value Protection (MVP) product was developed in 1990. This
was the first crop insurance contract that included price risk and because
all of the coverage had to be reinsured privately, those limits were set
very “tight”. Those limits were simply carried over to CRC when it was
approve in 1996. RA was approved with no limit in 2000 but had RMA
reinsurance so that all of the risk was not reinsured privately as was the
case for MVP.
CRC also had a downside
price limit that was the same as the limit on price increases. The downside
price limit was unnecessary because the price movement was limited to zero
price, i.e. no negative prices. The new rules appear to eliminate any limit
on downside price risk and that make sense.
One would have expected a
compromise between the extreme of no price limit and the CRC dollar limit.
The 160% limit simulates price limits that are similar to CRC but as the
designer of CRC these limits were too low. The crop insurance contract
often servers as the collateral for maintaining margins loans on a hedge
account. While there is little chance that the harvest price will exceed
the price limit, the markets can and do get wild in the summer time. A
higher limit of 180% or more would be valuable to growers and ag lenders.
The real value of CRC/RA-HPO is not the insurance indemnity payments but the
fact that it allows growers to maintain a hedge position. These replacement
insurance contracts effectively expand the marketing window up to 3 years
before harvest to 9 months after harvest with on farm storage and FSA
commodity loans. During the summer months the margin calls can exceed the
price limits in CRC and effectively start to reduce the hedge position. By
increasing the price limit from 160% to 180% that would lower the
possibility of margin calls during the growing season exceeding the price
limit but with little chance of paying those higher prices at harvest when
indemnity payments are calculated. Growers would prefer the no limit in the
RA-HPO contract but that probably is not a realistic alternative but higher
limits would seem reasonable.
Minimum Market
Trades Required. “ If there is not a minimum of 8 prices
established on full active trading days for the applicable contract months
specified for the insured crop in paragraph 3, additional daily settlement
prices will be used to establish the average daily settlement price until
there are 8 prices established on full active trading days.”
In addition: “there
are at least 25 open interest contracts on the relevant futures contract”
(Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14, 2006 / Proposed
Rules, p. 40202).
RMA will require 25 open
futures contract so that one has a “real” market test. This rule makes
sense. However, it unclear why RMA wants to reduce the current measurement
period for the base price from a month to two weeks (in most years this will
average 10 prices are less). A couple of major price movements could
greatly alter the average for such a short price measurement period. It is
unclear what RMA thinks is “broke” with the current monthly measurement. It
is also unclear how RMA will obtain the additional daily prices if the
market does not provide the minimum of 8 approved prices to be averaged.
For example if there are not 8 approved KCBOT September wheat prices for the
period from September 1 to 15, will RMA include prices on September 16, 17,
etc. until the minimum of 8 prices are observed? Or will RMA take the
additional prices during the last week of August? Or will RMA take prices
form other contract months, for example substitute new crop July prices for
non-trading September prices? Or will RMA use prices from the CBOT to
substitute for non-trading KCBOT prices? This pricing method is not defined
and one would probably want to leave open the alternative for the Board to
intervene as they did a few years ago. There was one year when the KCBOT
options did not trade and there was no volatility measure for the RA
contract. The Board made the decision before sales closing to use the
volility measure from the CBOT options and that clearly made sense.
RMA reserves the
right to omit any daily settlement price. “RMA reserves the
right to omit any daily settlement price RMA reserves the right to omit any
daily settlement price or additional daily settlement price if market
conditions are different than those used to rate or price revenue
protection” (For example, the trading hits the limits imposed by the
Commodity Exchange) (Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14,
2006 / Proposed Rules, p. 40202).
Why would one delete limit
moves in the market? We know the commodity is worth at least that amount
and in a day or two the market will trade higher (lower if it was limit down
move). This also increases the possibility that RMA will not meet the
minimum of 8 approved prices and all of the above issues will apply. If RMA
were to retain the monthly measurement then any limit move whether included
or omitted will have less impact on the final price.
Current RMA Price Discovery vs. Proposed Price Discovery
RMA is proposing a number
of changes in their price discovery procedure. Below are comparisons of the
historical price discovery for the current RA/CRC contracts versus the
historical prices using the new price discovery proposed under the Combo
policy.
Kansas Corn (and many
other states) (Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14,
2006 / Proposed Rules, p. 40210)
The new procedure will set
the base corn price using the average closing prices for February 14-28 of
the new crop CBOT December corn contract. The
harvest price will be the October average closing prices of the nearby CBOT
December corn contract. This is the same harvest price currently used by
CRC and will allow loss adjusters to settle both corn and soybean claims on
the same farm visit. There is little impact on the historical prices with
the Combo price changes (table 1). |