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Durbin-Brown Expected State Yields in Revenue Guarantee
Senator Durbin (D-IL) and Senator Brown (D-OH) have
introduced legislation that would change the current farm safety net. The
Durbin-Brown plan is a Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) with no
Harvest Revenue Option but based on state expected yields rather than county
yields. Durbin-Brown is effectively a “put option” on expected state
revenue. The Durbin-Brown revenue guarantee is based on a trend adjusted
yield using linear regression based on the state yields for the 27 years
from 1980-2006. Once the trend yield is calculated then USDA would forecast
off of the trend line to generate the expected state yields for future years
of the farm program based on this selected set of state yields (the expected
state yields by crop by state are presented below).
The Durbin-Brown revenue guarantee is the expected
state yield based on the Durbin-Brown formula times the Durbin-Brown strike
price times 90%. The state payment is then allocated to the farm level
through a formula but if there is no state payment to allocate then there
are no farm payments. The Durbin-Brown strike price is the three year
average Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC)/Revenue Assurance (RA) price subject to
a 15% price cap and cup.
The revenue to count against the Durbin-Brown guarantee
is the observed state yield times the CRC/RA harvest price. The legislation
does not specify using CRC or the RA price but it could make a difference.
The CRC price is capped at $2 for wheat. Therefore if prices increase
beyond the $2 limit then the CRC harvest price will be lower than the RA
harvest price. The CRC lower price would reduce the number of dollars to
count against the guarantee and increase the Durbin-Brown payment. However,
only Portland wheat has hit the CRC price limit but it could happen on other
crops in the future with a short crop. All of the analysis in this paper
used CRC prices.
Many policy observers believe there will be some type
of revenue guarantee similar to Durbin-Brown in the Farm Bill as an option.
It will be presented as a choice but with current strike prices in
Durbin-Brown that are much higher than the effective target prices and loan
rates, economics will cause farmers to select the Durbin-Brown option.
Durbin-Brown would replace the counter cyclical and marketing loan
payments.
It clearly makes a difference in the expected yield
depending on the crop years selected to calculate the expected trend yield.
Just eliminating one year and using 26 years to set the state expected
yield would reduce Kansas corn yield by about 3.5% while increasing Iowa
corn yield by about 0.5% and Kansas wheat yield by 0.9%. Kansas wheat would
prefer the 18 years 1989-2006 be used to set the Durbin-Brown expected
yield. That change would increase the expected Kansas wheat yield by more
than 5% while reducing the Kansas corn yield by more than 10% (Table 7).
The longer data set provides more observations and
reduces the effects of recent weather problems. Also it is better to
prorate the payment than increase the deductible for budget reasons. If one
were to set the deductible high enough there would be no claims.
The argument for deducting Durbin-Brown payments from
crop insurance indemnity payments is to prevent farmers from being paid
twice for the same loss, but is that true? Let’s assume a revenue insured
corn farm with a 133 bushel aph times a $4 planting price times 75% coverage
would generate a revenue guarantee of $400. The farmer’s expected revenue
is the average yield of 133 bushels (if there have been recent weather
problems, the farmer’s expected yield would be higher than the aph) times $4
new crop price equals $532. Let’s assume the farmer has a yield loss and
produces 100 bushels and the price falls to $3. This farmer has $300 of
sales to count against the $400 guarantee and the indemnity payment is $100
(less premium paid). The farmer’s total revenue is the sum of the $300 of
sales and a $100 crop insurance indemnity payment for a total of $400 and he
is short $132 from the expected revenue of $532.
Let’s assume the state revenue was also low and this
farmer received a Durbin-Brown payment of $50. Under the proposal the $50
Durbin-Brown payment would be deducted from the crop insurance indemnity
payment and the farmer would be paid the net indemnity payment of $50. The
farmer’s total revenue is the sum of the $300 of sales, $50 Durbin-Brown
payment and a $50 crop insurance indemnity payment for a total of $400 and
he is short $132 from the expected revenue of $532.
Durbin-Brown is not a perfect safety net. Durbin-Brown
will have reduced payments in states with “high” negative price-yield
correlation because when low yields occur they cause higher prices,
especially at the state and national level. The negative price-yield
correlations are greater in the core growing states, i.e. Kansas wheat, Iowa
corn. Because of a near record 24% increase in wheat prices combined with a
state yield that was more than 25% below the expected 2007 yield, the
Durbin-Brown plan would not have triggered payments based on 2007 Kansas
wheat losses.
The expected state revenue for 2007 Kansas wheat based
on the Durbin-Brown formula would have been 36.7 bushels times 90% times
$3.87 Durbin-Brown planting price
equals $127.83 revenue guarantee. The revenue to count was the observed
2007 state yield of 27.3 bushels times the Durbin-Brown harvest price of
$5.62 equals $153.43.
Because the revenue to count exceeds the guarantee, the 2007 Kansas wheat
Durbin-Brown payment is zero. It would have required a Kansas yield that is
below 22.7 bushels to trigger payments. The 2007 Kansas yield was 35.6%
below the expected but it would require a yield loss greater than 38.1% to
trigger 2007 Durbin-Brown payments on Kansas wheat.
The 2007 Kansas wheat yields ranged between zero in
Central Kansas to a bumper crop in Northwest Kansas. Crop insurance will
provided indemnity payments based on either farm level or county level
yields. If there had been a Durbin-Brown payment this year, farmers with a
bumper wheat crop would also have received the payment while crop insurance
targets payments to farmers with losses.
The proposed permanent disaster program would also
provide little help this year because Kansas’ fall crop yields will likely
offset the wheat losses, unless the farm was a single enterprise wheat farm
with losses.
Is the real issue overrating of crop insurance for corn
or are policy makers buying the argument by some economists that government
can provide crop insurance services cheaper than the private sector?
Clearly many people would find the argument that government can provide the
same level of service as the private sector for a lower cost to be very
unconvincing. However, the argument of overrating of crop insurance in the
Corn Belt has some supporting evidence.
If the issue is rating then policy makers need a
thorough review of RMA rating methods by a consulting actuary. It has been
several years since Milliman & Robinson completed its review of RMA rating
methods. Coverage levels of 80% and 85%, CRC, RA, RA-HPO, GRP, GRIP, GRIP-HRO,
dollar plans AGR and livestock products have been added to the RMA product
list. A complete review of RMA rating methods on all of these new products
and there interaction by a consulting actuary would be helpful in a report
to Congress before major changes are made to rates.
Why would one believe tying crop insurance and
Durbin-Brown together will fix any crop insurance rating problems? There is
some evidence to support the idea that corn is overrated but probably not as
overrated as assumed by many corn farmers. How much the rates are
“excessive” is not so simple and clearly cannot be based on a short number
of years when droughts are infrequent but severe in the Corn Belt. While
the recent losses have been low, one needs to base rates on at least 20
years of expected indemnities. The base rate on corn and the rate
relativity may not be correct, but any changes in rates should be based on
loss cost estimates.
Perhaps it would make more sense to deduct any
permanent disaster aid payments from the Durbin-Brown payment. This would
reduce the cost of Durbin-Brown and the permanent disaster aid payments are
funded from a different budget source. Tying Durbin-Brown with permanent
disaster aid payments rather than crop insurance would reduce any
administrative problems caused by payment limits because both programs will
likely include payment limits, while there is no limit on crop insurance
payments that have significant funding from farmer paid premiums.
The Durbin-Brown strike price is the 3 year average revenue insurance
price. The 3 year average revenue price for Kansas CRC wheat is $3.87
based on the CRC planting price of $3.56 in 2004, $3.52 in 2005, and
$4.52 in 2006 subject to a 15% cap and cup.
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